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Abstract
The existence of (Nash) equilibria with undesirable
properties is a well-known problem in game the-
ory, which has motivated much research directed at
the possibility of mechanisms for modifying games
in order to eliminate undesirable equilibria, or in-
troduce desirable ones. Taxation schemes are one
mechanism for modifying games in this way. In the
multi-agent systems community, taxation mecha-
nisms for incentive engineering have been studied
in the context of Boolean games with costs. These
are games in which each player assigns truth-values
to a set of propositional variables she uniquely
controls with the aim of satisfying an individual
propositional goal formula; different choices for
the player are also associated with different costs.
In such a game, each player prefers primarily to
see the satisfaction of their goal, and secondarily, to
minimise the cost of their choice. However, within
this setting – in which taxes operate on costs only –
it may well happen that the elimination or introduc-
tion of equilibria can only be achieved at the cost of
simultaneously introducing less desirable equilibria
or eliminating more attractive ones. Although this
framework has been studied extensively, the prob-
lem of precisely characterising the equilibria that
may be induced or eliminated has remained open.
In this paper we close this problem, giving a com-
plete characterisation of those mechanisms that can
induce a set of outcomes of the game to be exactly
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
1 Introduction
Game theory is widely used in multi-agent systems and arti-
ficial intelligence to model and understand the behaviour of
systems in which components are assumed to act in pursuit
of individual preferences [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008].
Probably the most important analytical concept in game the-
ory is the notion of Nash equilibrium, representing a state
of affairs such that no participant has any rational incentive
to deviate. However, a standard problem in game theory is
that strategic scenarios may have Nash equilibria with unde-
sirable properties. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example,
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Figure 1: A three-player Boolean game with costs. The row player
controls proposition p, the column player q, and the matrix player r.
The numerical entries refer to the costs incurred by, respectively,
the row, column, and matrix player at the corresponding outcome.
An entry being underlined indicates that the corresponding player
has her goal satisfied and Nash equilibria are encircled. The shaded
cells are equilibria under no taxation scheme.
the unique Nash equilibrium outcome is strictly worse for all
players than an alternative outcome. This problem – the pres-
ence of undesirable equilibria – has motivated research on the
development of mechanisms for modifying games, with the
goal of either eliminating undesirable equilibria, or inducing
desirable ones.
Taxation mechanisms represent one natural class of mech-
anisms for manipulating games. The idea is that by levying
taxes on the actions of agents, it is possible to incentivise an
agent to avoid or choose a particular action (cf., e.g., [Cordes,
1999; Tobin, 1978; Meade, 1952; Coase, 1960]). In the multi-
agent systems literature, this idea has been investigated in
the context of Boolean games with costs [Wooldridge et al.,
2013]. In such a game, each player exercises unique con-
trol over a set of propositional variables, in the sense that the
player can choose to assign values (true or false) to these vari-
ables as they wish. Preferences in the game are defined by as-
sociating with each agent a propositional formula represent-
ing a goal that the player desires to see satisfied. Different as-
signments of values to variables induce different costs for the
corresponding agent, and while players are primarily moti-
vated to seek the satisfaction of their goal, they are secondar-
ily motivated to minimise costs. Because taxation schemes
can apply additional costs to actions (or subsidise actions),
designing such a scheme can influence the rational behaviour
of players, making it possible to eliminate some equilibria or
introduce new ones. However, as players always prefer to get
their goal achieved than otherwise, there is an inherent limit
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Figure 2: An attempt to raise taxes to eliminate the undesirable equi-
libria pqr and p¯q¯r of the game in Figure 1. As a result, p¯qr – which
is less desirable for every player than either pqr and p¯q¯r in the origi-
nal game – becomes a Nash equilibrium. Notice that no such attempt
will be successful: the set {pqr, p¯qr, p¯q¯r} is dominating but contains
no cycle involving at least two players.
to the manipulation that is possible through taxation: a player
can never be incentivised away from achieving her goal.
The basic framework of taxation mechanism for Boolean
games with costs was introduced by [Wooldridge et al.,
2013], and has since been investigated and extended by other
authors [Harrenstein et al., 2014; Turrini, 2013; 2016]. How-
ever, fundamental questions remain unanswered about the ex-
tent to which Boolean games can be manipulated through tax-
ation. One issue in particular is that, while it may be possible
to eliminate some undesirable equilibrium from a game, this
process may inadvertently introduce new undesirable equilib-
ria. Consider for example the Boolean game in Figure 1 with
three equilibria. The top-right outcome is an equilibrium in
which all players have their goals achieved at minimum cost.
The other two equilibria are less desirable for all players. Yet,
as illustrated in Figure 2, any attempt at eliminating these
with the same taxation scheme will result in the bottom-left
outcome becoming an equilibrium. This outcome, however,
is worse for all players than the original two that were elimi-
nated.
To date, the problem of precisely characterising the sets of
equilibria that can be eliminated or introduced through taxa-
tion has remained open. It is this problem that we address,
and settle, in the present paper: we give for the first time a
complete characterisation of the sets of outcomes in Boolean
games with costs that may be induced or eliminated through
taxation mechanisms.
2 Boolean Games with Costs
We use the framework of Boolean games with costs as pre-
sented in [Wooldridge et al., 2013].1 Formally, a Boolean
game with costs (hereafter just “Boolean game” or “game”)
is given by a structure, (N, {Φi}i∈N , {γi}i∈N , c). Here, N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of players (or agents). Each player i
uniquely controls a set of propositional variables Φi and is
associated with a goal γi, a propositional logic formula con-
structed from the total set of propositional variables Φ =
Φ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Φn. The sets Φ1, . . . ,Φn are assumed to parti-
tion Φ, ensuring that each variable is controlled by precisely
1The framework of Boolean games was initiated by [Harrenstein
et al., 2001]. Important follow-up work includes [Bonzon et al.,
2006; 2009], [Dunne et al., 2008], [Grant et al., 2011], [Mavronico-
las et al., 2015], and [Clercq et al., 2015].
one player. A choice (or strategy or action) for player i is a
an assignment of truth or falsity to all variables that i controls,
that is, a function of the form vi : Φi → {>,⊥}. The set of
all such choices for player i is denoted Vi. Players, indepen-
dently and simultaneously, make individual choices, giving
rise to a profile (of choices) of the form (v1, . . . , vn). The set
of profiles is denoted V and we let (v−i, v′i) abbreviate the pro-
file (v1, . . . , vi−1, v′i , vi+1, . . . , vn). Each profile (v1, . . . , vn)
naturally defines to a unique valuation v : Φ → {>,⊥} for
the total set of propositional variables. We write pq¯r¯ to denote
the profile in which variable p is set to true and variables q
and r are set to false, and similarly for other valuations. We
will generally not notationally distinguish between profiles
and valuations. For a profile v and formula ϕ over Φ, we will
thus write v |= ϕ to signify that v satisfies ϕ, where |= is the
standard propositional satisfaction relation. We also say that
the valuation v = v1 ∪ · · · ∪ vn is the outcome that results if
profile (v1, . . . , vn) is played.
At each profile every player incurs a cost. These costs are
modelled by an (outcome-based) cost function c, which for
each player i specifies a function ci : V → Q≥0, associ-
ating a non-negative rational cost with each profile. (Here
we deviate from the more restrictive additive notion of cost
in [Wooldridge et al., 2013], where costs are associated with
setting a propositional variables to a specific Boolean value:
the present model is more expressive.) If B is a Boolean game
with cost function c and d is another cost function, then Bd
denotes the Boolean game that results from B by replacing c
by d. We denote by c0 the zero-cost function, which assigns
cost 0 to every player i and every valuation, that is, c0i (v) = 0
for all players i and all valuations v. Furthermore, we write B0
for Bc
0
to avoid cluttered notation.
As discussed in the introduction, players prioritise goal re-
alisation over cost minimisation, that is, each will prefer out-
comes that satisfy her goal to outcomes that do not, no mat-
ter the respective costs, and prefer cheaper outcomes to more
expensive ones, otherwise. Accordingly, costs refine the di-
chotomous preferences each player has over the outcomes
on basis of her goal alone. Formally, we model the prefer-
ences of player i as a complete and transitive relation over
outcomes. Thus, given a Boolean game with cost function c
and a player i with goal γi, we say that i weakly prefers out-
come v to outcome v′, in symbols v c v′, if
(i) v |= γi and v′ 6|= γi, or
(ii) both v |= γi if and only if v′ |= γi, and ci(v) ≤ ci(v′).
We useci and∼ci for, respectively, the strict and indifferent
parts of ci in the usual way, and write 0i , 0i , and ∼0i if c
is c0. Observe that v %0i v′ if and only if v′ |= γi implies
v |= γi. As a consequence ci refines 0i , in the sense that ci
is a subset of 0i and thus v ci v′ implies v 0i v′.2
Defined thus, Boolean games represent strategic games and
as such the standard solution concepts from game theory are
2The opposite direction also holds: for every preference (i.e., re-
flexive, transitive, and complete) relation i over the outcomes that
refines 0i , there is an outcome-based cost function c such that i
equals ci . This, however, does not generally hold for the additive
cost functions of [Wooldridge et al., 2013].
available for their analysis. The solution concept we work
with is pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Formally, a pro-
file v = (v1, . . . , vn) of a Boolean game B with cost function c
is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium if for all players i and
all choices v′i ∈ Vi, we have:
v ci (v1, . . . , vi−1, v′i , vi+1, . . . , vn).
We denote the set of pure Nash equilibria of a Boolean
game B by NE(B). Pure Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to
exist, and, when they exist, they need not be unique.
The Nash equilibria of a Boolean game depend both on the
players’ goals and on the cost function. Thus, [Harrenstein
et al., 2014] distinguished hard, soft, and initial equilibria. A
profile v is an initial equilibrium of a Boolean game B if it is
an equilibrium of B0. Having observed that ci refines 0i for
every cost function c and every player i, it follows that gen-
erally NE(Bc) ⊆ NE(B0). Accordingly, profile v is an initial
equilibrium of a Boolean game B if and only if v is an equi-
librium of Bc for some cost function c. By contrast, a hard
equilibrium of B is a profile v that is a Nash equilibrium in Bc
for every cost function c. Finally, v is a soft equilibrium of B
if it is an initial equilibrium of B that is not hard. We denote
the initial, hard, and soft equilibria of game B by INIT(B),
HARD(B), and SOFT(B), respectively. It is easy to see that
the stability of hard equilibria only depends on the players’
goals, whereas it is the cost function that determines whether
a soft equilibrium is also actually a Nash equilibrium of a
given game. For example, the initial equilibria of the game
in Figure 1 are pqr, p¯qr, p¯q¯r, and pq¯r¯; while the former three
are soft, the latter is hard.
3 Manipulating Boolean Games
Over the past few years, a number of contributions have
focussed on understanding how a system designer can in-
centivise players in a Boolean game by manipulating the
cost function by levying taxes. This line of research started
with [Wooldridge et al., 2013] and was pursued further
by, e.g., [Harrenstein et al., 2014; 2016]. For the purposes of
this paper, we have an (outcome-based) taxation scheme τ
associate with every player i a function τi that maps each pro-
file to a non-negative rational number, that is,
τi : V → Q≥0.
A taxation scheme τ modifies the cost function of a Boolean
game, meaning that it increases the cost for every player i at
every profile v according to τ . Given Boolean game B with
cost function c, a taxation scheme τ gives rise to a cost func-
tion cτ = c + τ defined such that, for each player i and each
profile v,
cτi (v) = ci(v) + τi(v).
Thus, the application of a taxation scheme τ to a Boolean
game B with cost function c results in the Boolean game Bc
τ
with cost function cτ . Every taxation scheme induces a
cost transformation and, moreover, every cost transforma-
tion can be achieved by a taxation scheme modulo positive
affine transformations. We write Bτ for Bc
τ
and v τi v′ for
v cτi v′, whenever c is known from the context. For τ and τ ′
taxation schemes, we write τ + τ ′ for the taxation scheme τ ′′
such that τ ′′i (v) = τi(v) + τ
′
i (v).
Previous work on incentive engineering for Boolean
games, in particular [Wooldridge et al., 2013], has focussed
on taxation schemes that eliminate individual soft equilibria
or induce such to become Nash equilibria. However, if v can
be eliminated under some taxation scheme and v′ under an-
other, it does not generally follow that v and v′ can both be
eliminated by the same taxation scheme. As we saw in Fig-
ures 1 and 2, the elimination of some (undesirable) equilib-
rium may inevitably result in another, perhaps worse, equilib-
rium coming into being.
For Boolean game B and set of profiles X, we say that a
taxation scheme τ induces X if NE(Bτ ) = X and elimi-
nates X if no v ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium in Bτ , that is, if
NE(Bτ ) ∩ X = ∅. Our main research question can then be
phrased as which sets of profiles can be eliminated by some
(outcome-based) taxation scheme and which sets can be in-
duced. In Section 4, we answer this question by providing
characterisations of inducible and eliminating sets in Boolean
games that do not involve cost functions or taxation schemes
and only pertains to the players’ goals. For reasons of space,
we will omit some of the easier proofs.
We find that attention can be restricted to games with the
zero cost function c0. Let B be a game with cost function c
and τ a taxation scheme. Recall that then NE(Bτ ) ⊆ NE(B0).
Moreover, for every taxation scheme τ , there is another taxa-
tion scheme τ ′ such that c + τ = c0 + τ ′. Similarly, for ev-
ery τ ′ there is a τ and constant k and such that c0 + τ ′ + k =
c + τ . As raising costs by a constant everywhere does not
affect the preference structure, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let B be a Boolean game with cost function c
and X ⊆ V a subset of profiles. Then,
(i) X is inducible in B if and only if X is inducible in B0,
(ii) X is eliminable in B if and only if X is eliminable in B0.
4 Characterising Inducible and Eliminable Sets
[Harrenstein et al., 2016] identified necessary and sufficient
conditions for hard, soft, and initial equilibria that only de-
pend on the players’ goals and not on the cost functions. In
order to achieve the same for inducible and eliminable sets
of equilibria, we first distinguish initial, soft, and hard devi-
ations. Let v, v′ be two distinct outcomes and i a player and
v′ = (v−i, v′′i ) for some v
′′
i ∈ Vi. We then say that:
• v′ is an initial deviation for i from v, (denoted v→i v′),
if v |= γi implies v′ |= γi,
• v′ is a soft deviation for i from v, (denoted by v i v′),
if both v→i v′ and v′ →i v.
• v′ is a hard deviation for i from v, (denoted by v⇒i v′),
if v→i v′ but not v′ →i v.
Thus, ⇒i and i partition the initial deviation relation →i
into a strict and a non-strict part, respectively. Also observe
that→i,i, and⇒i are independent of the cost function and
only depend on i’s goal formula. In particular, we have that
v ⇒i v′ if and only if v 6|= γi and v′ |= γi. The following
lemma, moreover, is an immediate consequence of the lexi-
cographic nature of preferences in Boolean games with costs.
Lemma 2. Let B be a Boolean game. Then, for all distinct
outcomes v, v′ ∈ V, each of the following hold.
(i) v→i v′ if and only if v′ ci v for some cost function c,
(ii) vi v′ if and only if v′ ci v for some cost function c
and v c′i v′ for another cost function c′,
(iii) v⇒i v′ if and only if v′ ci v for all cost functions c.
Accordingly, a profile v is an initial equilibrium if and only if
there is no hard deviation from v, and that v is a hard equilib-
rium if and only if there is no initial deviation from v. A soft
equilibrium, moreover, is an initial equilibrium from which
there is at least one soft deviation. As our main result we
show that in a similar way we can characterise inducible and
eliminable sets in terms of the initial deviation relations→i.
We first generalise the concept of a hard equilibrium to sets
of profiles and say that a nonempty set X is dominating if for
all v ∈ X, all players i, and all v′′i ∈ Vi such that (v−i, v′′i ) /∈ X,
it holds that (v−i, v′′i ) ⇒i v. Equivalently, a nonempty set X
is dominating if and only if there is no player i for whom
there is an initial deviation from some v in X to some pro-
file v′ outside X. In the game of Figure 2, we thus find that
{pqr, p¯qr, p¯q¯r} is a dominating set, because pq¯r ⇒1 p¯q¯r,
pq¯r ⇒2 pqr, as well as pqr¯ ⇒3 pqr, p¯qr¯ ⇒3 p¯qr, and
p¯q¯r¯ ⇒3 p¯q¯r. It can easily be seen that V is (trivially) a dom-
inating set and that dominating sets are closed under union.
By a (set-inclusion) minimal dominating set we understand
a subset of outcomes that is dominating and contains no dom-
inating sets as strict subsets.
A cycle in X, moreover, we define as a sequence
v0, v1, . . . , vk of k ≥ 3 distinct profiles in X such that
v0 = vk and v0 →i1 v1 →i2 . . . →ik vk for some play-
ers i1, . . . , ik ∈ N. We say that a cycle v0, . . . , vk in X in-
volves player i if i = im for some 1 ≤ m ≤ k. Thus,
in Figure 2, the set {pqr, p¯qr, p¯q¯r} can be seen to con-
tain no cycle. In the game depicted in Figure 3, however,
p¯qr¯s, p¯q¯r¯s, p¯q¯r¯s¯, p¯qr¯s¯, p¯qr¯s is a cycle in V , because
p¯qr¯s→1 p¯q¯r¯s→3 p¯q¯r¯s¯→1 p¯qr¯s¯→3 p¯qr¯s.
After a couple of technical lemmas, we will be in a position
to prove that a set X of profiles is eliminable if and only if all
dominating sets in X contain a cycle involving at least two
players (Theorem 10) and that X is inducible if and only if X
is a subset of initial equilibria and the complement V \ X is
eliminable (Theorem 11).
4.1 Characterisation
The characterisation of inducible sets relies on the characteri-
sation of eliminable sets and we concentrate on the latter first.
We thus find that sets that do not contain any dominating sets
are always eliminable. Observe that this excludes the set V of
all profiles, which is dominating itself.
Lemma 3. Let B be a Boolean game and assume X ⊆ V
contains no dominating sets. Then, X is eliminable.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we may assume that B = B0. If X
is empty we are done immediately. Now assume that X is
nonempty. As V is dominating, X 6= V . Hence, V \ X
is non-empty. We now construct inductively a sequence
X1,X2,X3 . . . of subsets of V such that, for every m ≥ 1,
X1 = {v ∈ X : v→i v′ for some v′ ∈ V \ X and i ∈ N},
Xm+1 = {v ∈ X : v→i v′ for some v′ ∈ Xm and i ∈ N} ∪ Xm.
Observe that X1 ⊆ X2 ⊆ X3 ⊆ · · · . Moreover, as X is
nonempty and not dominating, X1 6= ∅. Also, for every
m ≥ 1, we have that Xm ⊆ X and X \ Xm is not dominat-
ing. Accordingly, Xm ( Xm+1 provided that Xm 6= X. As V
is finite, it follows that
⋃
m≥1 X
m = X. Define τ such that, for
each v ∈ V and each player i,
τi(v) =
{
min{m ≥ 1 : v ∈ Xm} v ∈ X,
0 otherwise.
Now consider an arbitrary v ∈ X. Then, there is a minimal
m ≥ 1 with v ∈ Xm. If m = 1, there is a player i and a
v′ ∈ V \ X such that v →i v′ and hence v ≺τi v′. If m > 1,
there is a player i and a v′ ∈ Xm−1 such that v →i v′ and
hence v ≺τi v′. We may conclude that X contains no Nash
equilibria of Bτ , signifying that X is eliminable.
We now consider the case in which the set X to be elimi-
nated does contain dominating sets. Having assumed a finite
number of profiles, every dominating set contains at least one
minimal dominating set. Although dominating sets may over-
lap, distinct minimal dominating sets will be disjoint.
Lemma 4. Let B be a Boolean game and X,Y ⊆ V be over-
lapping dominating sets. Then, X ∩ Y is also a dominating
set. Therefore, distinct minimal dominating sets are disjoint.
We now introduce the following auxiliary concept. For X
a set of profiles, we say a taxation scheme is local on X (or
X-local) if τi(v) = 0, for all players i and all profiles v /∈
X. Thus, a taxation scheme is local if it only raises taxes on
valuations in X and no taxes on valuations outside X. The
following two lemmas show that taxes that are local on X
cannot eliminate equilibria that lie outside X, and that a set X
can be eliminated if and only if it can be eliminated by an
X-local taxation scheme.
Lemma 5. Let B be a Boolean game, τ be an taxation scheme
that is X-local for some X ⊆ V, and v a profile with v /∈ X.
Then, v ∈ NE(B) implies v ∈ NE(Bτ ).
Lemma 6. Let B be a Boolean game and X ⊆ V. Then, X is
eliminable if and only if X is eliminable by an X-local taxa-
tion scheme.
Introducing a second auxiliary concept, we say that a set X
is endogenously eliminable if there is a taxation scheme τ
such that for every outcome v ∈ X there is a player i and
v′i ∈ X such that (v−i, v′i) ∈ X and v τi (v−i, v′i), that is,
if τ induces profitable deviations from every outcome in X
to another outcome in X. Observe that, as a consequence of
Lemmas 2 and 6, dominating sets are eliminable only if they
are endogenously eliminable by an X-local taxation scheme.
Lemma 7. Let B be a Boolean game and X a dominating
set. Then, X is eliminable if and only if X is endogenously
eliminable by an X-local taxation scheme.
We moreover have the following simple but useful lemma.
Lemma 8. Let B be a Boolean game with cost function c
and Y ⊆ X ⊆ V such that Y is endogenously eliminable.
Then, X is eliminable if and only if X \ Y is eliminable.
Proof. The “only if”-direction is immediate. For the opposite
direction, let τX\Y be a taxation scheme that eliminates X \ Y
and τY one that eliminates Y endogenously. Observe that by
virtue of Lemma 6 we may assume that τX\Y is local on X\Y .
Then, define τX such that for all players i and all v ∈ V ,
τXi (v) =
{
τYi (v) if v ∈ Y ,
τ
X\Y
i (v) + max{τYi (u) : y ∈ Y} otherwise.
Now, τX eliminates X \Y and Y , the latter endogenously.
We can now establish necessary and sufficient conditions
for the eliminability of minimal dominating sets. To appreci-
ate our results, call a cycle v0, v1, . . . , vk a deviation cycle if
vk cik vk−1 cik−1 · · · ci1 v0. Obviously, no profile contained
in a deviation cycle can be an equilibrium, irrespective of the
costs on the other profiles. The intuition underlying Lemma 9
is that, for every cycle in a minimal dominating set involving
at least two players, we can find a taxation scheme that turns
it into a deviation cycle and, consequently, eliminates it en-
dogenously. Lemma 8 then guarantees that the minimal dom-
inating set itself can be eliminated. We find, moreover, that
this sufficient condition for eliminability is also necessary.
Lemma 9. Let B be a Boolean game and X a minimal dom-
inating set. Then, X is eliminable if and only if X contains a
cycle involving at least two distinct players.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we may assume that B = B0. First as-
sume that taxation scheme τ eliminates X. Having assumed
that X is dominating, τ eliminates X endogenously. Hence,
for every v ∈ X, there is a v′ ∈ X and player i, such that v ≺τi
v′. As X is finite, it follows that there are v0, v1, . . . , vm with
v0 ≺τi1 v1 ≺τi2 · · · ≺τim vm and v0 = vm. Then, by Lemma 2,
also v0 →i1 v1 →i2 . . . →im vm, that is, v0, v1, . . . , vm is a
cycle in X. By assuming that v0, v1, . . . , vm involves only one
player i, we would obtain v0 ≺τi vm whereas v0 = vm, a con-
tradiction. We may therefore conclude that v0, v1, v2, . . . , vm
is a cycle in X involving at least two players.
For the opposite direction, assume that X contains a cycle
v0, v1, . . . , vm that involves at least two players i and j. Then,
v0 →i1 v1 →i2 . . . →im vm. Now define a taxation scheme τj
for each player j as follows. As v0, v1, . . . , vm involves at least
two players, there is a least 1 ≤ k ≤ m such that j 6= ik. Let
w1, . . . ,wm = vk, . . . , vm, v1, . . . , vk−1
and then define τj(wm
′
) = m − m′ for every 1 ≤ m′ ≤ m.
Accordingly, w1 ≺τj · · · ≺τj wm. Intuitively, the cycle is lin-
earised by breaking it at the kth edge and decreasing taxes
on j are raised along vk, . . . , vm, v1, . . . , vk−1. This induces
deviations for j. Thus, j incurs low taxes at vk−1 and rela-
tively high ones at vk and j does not want to deviate from
vk−1 to vk. That does not matter, however, as exactly that de-
viation is to be performed by player ik, which was assumed
to be distinct from j. Having defined τ in this way, it follows
that v0 ≺τi1 v1 ≺τi1 · · · ≺τim vm. Accordingly, τ eliminates
{v0, v1, . . . , vm} endogenously. To finish the proof, recall that
we had assumed X to be minimally dominating. Hence, the
set X \ {v0, v1, . . . , vm} contains no dominating set and is,
by virtue of Lemma 3, eliminable. As, moreover, τ endoge-
nously eliminates {v0, v1, . . . , vm}, it follows by Lemma 8
that X is eliminable itself.
The results obtained so far put us in a position to prove our
first main result and provide a complete characterisation of
eliminable sets of equilibria. Here, the crucial part is to ob-
serve that, if two minimal dominating sets are eliminable sep-
arately, there is also a taxation scheme that eliminates them
both.
Theorem 10. Let B be a Boolean game and X ⊆ V. Then, X
is eliminable if and only if every minimal dominating subset
Y ⊆ X contains a cycle involving at least two players.
Proof. For the “only if”-direction, let Y be a minimal domi-
nating subset of X and assume for contraposition that Y con-
tains no cycle involving at least two players. By Lemma 9, it
follows that Y is not eliminable and, hence, neither is X.
For the opposite direction, let Y1, . . . ,Ym be all the min-
imal dominating sets contained in X and assume for each
1 ≤ k ≤ m that Yk contains a cycle involving at least two
players. By Lemmas 7 and 9, each Yk is endogenously elim-
inable by some Yk-local taxation scheme τ k. Define τY such
that, for every profile v and player i,
τYi (v) = τ
Y1(v) + · · ·+ τYki (v).
Observe that τY is local on Y = Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yk. By virtue of
Lemma 4, moreover, the sets Y1, . . . ,Ym are pairwise disjoint
and, therefore, τYi (v) = τ
Yk (v) if and only if v ∈ Yk. Some
reflection then reveals that τY eliminates Y endogenously. Fi-
nally observe that X \Y contains no dominating sets and thus,
by Lemma 3, is eliminable. By Lemma 8, we may conclude
that X is eliminable as well, as desired.
Our second main result, which provides a characterisation
of inducible sets, now follows as a corollary of Theorem 10.
Theorem 11. Let B be a Boolean game and X ⊆ V. Then, X
is inducible if and only if X ⊆ INIT(B) and every minimal
dominating subset Y ⊆ V \ X contains a cycle involving at
least two players.
Proof. For the “only if”-direction, assume that there is a tax-
ation scheme τ such that NE(Bτ ) = X. Then, immediately,
X ⊆ INIT(B). Moreover, τ eliminates V \ X and hence, by
Theorem 10, every minimal dominating set in V \ X contains
a cycle involving at least two players.
For the opposite direction, assume that X ⊆ INIT(B) and
every minimal dominating subset Y ⊆ V \ X contains a cycle
involving at least two players. We show that X can be induced
in B0. Lemma 1 then gives the result.
By Theorem 10, we find that V \ X is eliminable in B0. By
Lemma 6, moreover, V \ X is eliminable in B0 by a V \ X-
local taxation scheme τ . Now observe that X ⊆ NE(B0).
Accordingly, Lemma 5 yields X ⊆ NE(B0+τ ). Hence,
NE(B0+τ ) = X, that is, X is inducible in B0, as desired.
pq
pq¯
p¯q
p¯q¯
r r¯
3, 1, 1 3, 0, 1
2, 1, 1 2, 0, 1
1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
0, 1, 1 0, 0, 1
s
pq
pq¯
p¯q
p¯q¯
r r
3, 1, 0 3, 0, 0
2, 1, 0 2, 0, 0
1, 1, 0 1, 0, 0
0, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
s
Figure 3: A Boolean game with additive costs in which the set V \
{pqr¯s¯, pq¯r¯s¯, p¯qrs, p¯q¯rs} can be eliminated by an outcome-based tax-
ation scheme, but not by an additive one.
4.2 On Additive Costs and Taxes
Our definitions of outcome-based cost functions and taxa-
tion schemes diverge slightly from the additive variants used
by [Wooldridge et al., 2013]. Both additive cost-functions c
and additive taxation schemes τ map pairs in Φ × {⊥,>}
to a non-negative rational and, respectively, define outcome-
based cost-functions cˆ and outcome-based taxation schemes τˆ
such that, for every player i and outcome v,
cˆi(v) =
∑
p∈Φi : v(p)=>
c(p,>) +
∑
p∈Φi : v(p)=⊥
c(p,⊥) τˆi(v) =
∑
p∈Φi : v(p)=>
τ(p,>) +
∑
p∈Φi : v(p)=⊥
τ(p,⊥).
The structure an additive cost function imposes on the val-
uations is more regular than that of outcome-based cost func-
tions but nevertheless highly non-trivial.3 The problem of
characterising eliminable and inducible sets of equilibria is
correspondingly more complicated in this setting.
Consider the Boolean game in Figure 3, where the additive
cost function c is such that c(p,>) = 2, c(q,>) = c(r,>) =
c(s,>) = 1, and c(x,⊥) = 0 for all variables x. The set
X = V \ {pqr¯s¯, pq¯r¯s¯, p¯qrs, p¯q¯rs} can be eliminated by the
outcome-based taxation scheme τ ′ that levies taxes of 2 on
the row player at p¯q¯r¯s¯ and nil taxes otherwise. By contrast, X
is not eliminable by any additive taxation scheme. To see
this, observe that for any such scheme τ should eliminate the
equilibrium p¯q¯r¯s¯. Hence, τˆrow(p¯q¯r¯s¯)− τˆrow(p¯qr¯s¯) > 1. This,
however, would imply that τ(q,⊥) − τ(q,>) > 1. Hence,
pqrs τˆrow pq¯rs, causing pqrs to be an equilibrium under τˆ .
Interestingly, if we consider the game in Figure 4, which
results from the one in Figure 3 when the outcomes the rows
p¯q and p¯q¯ are interchanged with respect to the players’ goal
satisfaction, we find that the set X is eliminable by the addi-
tive taxation scheme that levies zero taxes all around. Yet, the
graphs on the valuations induced by the initial deviation rela-
tions→i in both games are identical up to permuting the val-
uations. Consequently, eliminability, and therewith inducibil-
ity, of sets of outcomes by additive taxation schemes does not
only depend on the (graph theoretic) structure of the initial
deviation relations→i, but also on the very propositions that
are set to true or false in the valuations. This reveals a funda-
mental mathematical distinction between the outcome-based
and additive settings.
3This issue is closely related to additive conjoint measurement as
studied in measurement theory (see, e.g., [Suppes and Zinnes, 1963;
Krantz et al., 1971; Roberts, 1979; Slinko, 2009]).
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1, 1, 1 1, 0, 1
0, 1, 1 0, 0, 1
s
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2, 1, 0 2, 0, 0
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0, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
s
Figure 4: The game of Figure 3 with players’ goal satisfaction in
rows p¯q and p¯q¯ interchanged.
5 Conclusion
We have studied equilibrium elimination and introduction via
incentive engineering in the context of Boolean games. The
problem of fully characterising the conditions under which
this is possible was an open problem we inherited from the re-
lated literature, notably [Wooldridge et al., 2013], which had
only focussed on induction and elimination strategies for sin-
gle Nash equilibria. We have settled the problem for the gen-
eral case outcome-based taxation mechanisms (that is, uncon-
strained transformations of the players’ cost function). Our
characterisations reduce to the presence of cycles of possible
(that is, initial) deviations in some fully separated subsets of
outcomes. Still, a number of research questions remain.
First, there is need to characterise eliminability and in-
ducibility under the more restrictive additional taxation
mechanisms. We observed how the characterisation under
outcome-based taxation mechanisms does not carry over to
the additive setting. This does of course not show that no such
characterisation can be obtained, but we have to leave the is-
sue as an open problem. A similar point concerns the side-
payment schemes as studied by [Harrenstein et al., 2014].
A second point that deserves attention is how to compare
the desirability of the sets of outcomes that are induced under
different taxation or side-payment schemes. If viewed from
the perspective of the players’ welfare, this requires to raise
preferences over outcomes to preferences over sets of out-
comes. In the social choice literature there have been several
proposals for such metrics (cf. e.g., [Barbera` et al., 2004]).
One of the main advantages of Boolean games lies in their
computational aspects and connections with logic. A third
issue is therefore to establish the computational complexity
of deciding whether a given set of outcomes is inducible or
eliminable by a taxation scheme. We trust our results provide
deeper insight into the structure of these problems.
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